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COMMENTS 
THE SEARCH FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL 
JUSTIFICATION FOR THE 
NONCOMMERCIAL PRONG OF  
18 U.S.C. § 2423(C) 
Jessica E. Notebaert* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In September 2011, the Third Circuit became the first U.S. court of 
appeals to definitively address the constitutionality of a federal statute 
criminalizing citizens’ noncommercial, overseas sexual conduct.1  In United 
States v. Pendleton, it upheld the noncommercial prong2 of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2423(c) against the defendant’s facial challenge.3  The Pendleton court, 
like other courts that have considered the issue, held that the Foreign 
Commerce Clause gave Congress the power to pass § 2423(c), which 
criminalizes “travel[ing] in foreign commerce, and engag[ing] in any illicit 
sexual conduct with another person.”4  But no two courts have used 
 
* J.D., Northwestern University School of Law, 2013; B.A., Yale University, 2008.  I am 
grateful for the thoughtful editorial assistance of Liz Cartwright, Daniel Faichney, Tim Fry, 
Jonathan Jacobson, Caitlin Kovacs, Megan Lawson, Olesya Salnikova, Kelsey B. Shust, 
Hannah Wendling, and the staff of the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology. 
1 United States v. Pendleton, 658 F.3d 299, 308–11 (3d Cir. 2011).  Other courts have 
explicitly reserved the issue, declining to address it until it would be dispositive of the case 
before the court.  See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1109–10 (9th Cir. 2006). 
2 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c) criminalizes two types of conduct—engaging in commercial sex 
acts and committing the sexual abuse of a minor.  See infra text accompanying notes 19–24.  
Accordingly, the statute is said to have two prongs, a “commercial” prong and a 
“noncommercial” prong.  See Clark, 435 F.3d at 1105. 
3 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c) (2006); Pendleton, 658 F.3d at 311. 
4 18 U.S.C.§ 2423(c); Pendleton, 658 F.3d at 308–11; see also Clark, 435 F.3d at 1103; 
United States v. Flath, 845 F. Supp. 2d. 951, 954–957 (E.D. Wis. 2012); United States v. 
Martinez, 599 F. Supp. 2d 784, 808 (W.D. Tex. 2009); United States v. Bianchi, No. 06-19, 
2007 WL 1521123, at *5 (E.D. Pa. May 22, 2007); cf. United States v. Bredimus, 352 F.3d 
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precisely the same reasoning in reaching that conclusion, leaving the 
noncommercial prong of § 2423(c) on shaky constitutional ground.5 
This Comment analyzes the possible constitutional justifications for 
the noncommercial prong of § 2423(c), which has primarily been used to 
prosecute U.S. citizens who engage in child sex abuse overseas.  It 
advocates for a single test to determine the constitutionality of a criminal 
statute passed pursuant to Congress’s Foreign Commerce Clause authority.  
It also argues that there is an alternate constitutional basis for statutes 
criminalizing citizens’ overseas conduct—Congress’s power to pass laws 
effectuating treaty obligations.  As prosecutions of § 2423(c) violations 
become more frequent,6 definitively resolving the statute’s constitutional 
status may prevent protracted pretrial proceedings disputing the statute’s 
legitimacy and normalize decisions across the lower federal courts. 
Part II of this Comment describes the background of § 2423(c), 
including the statute’s origins, current form, and operation.  It also surveys 
recent Foreign Commerce Clause jurisprudence, particularly as it relates to 
§ 2423(c), with the goal of identifying and analyzing the different 
approaches taken by lower federal courts. 
Part III.A articulates a test for analyzing whether a statute that 
criminalizes citizens’ overseas conduct is constitutional under the Foreign 
Commerce Clause.  Applying that test, this Part concludes that Congress 
exceeded its authority under the Foreign Commerce Clause when it passed 
the noncommercial prong of § 2423(c).  Part III.B argues that prosecutions 
under § 2423(c) of noncommercial child sex abuse occurring overseas may 
be constitutionally sound, but under Congress’s Necessary and Proper 
Clause powers, not its Foreign Commerce Clause authority.  The Necessary 
and Proper Clause authorizes Congress to pass laws, such as § 2423(c), to 
implement the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Optional 
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of 
Children, Child Prostitution, and Child Pornography (Optional Protocol), a 
multilateral treaty to which the United States is a signatory.7 
 
200, 208 (5th Cir. 2003) (reaching the same conclusion in a case litigating the constitutional 
status of a related statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b)). 
5 See infra text accompanying notes 66–147. 
6 Justice News, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Eric Holder Speaks at the 
National Summit on Protecting Children from Sexual Exploitation (Oct. 14, 2011), available 
at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2011/ag-speech-1110141.html (“In recent 
years, investigations and prosecutions of child exploitation crimes have increased 
dramatically. . . .  [The challenge of child exploitation] demands our most aggressive, 
innovative, and comprehensive possible response.”). 
7 Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 
U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990); Optional Protocol to the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, 
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Part III.C argues that prosecutors who wish to avoid litigating the 
unsettled constitutional status of § 2423(c) can obtain substantially the same 
results for substantially the same conduct under a related statute, § 2423(b).  
Section 2423(b) criminalizes, in pertinent part, “travel[ing] in foreign 
commerce, for the purpose of engaging in any illicit sexual conduct with 
another person.”8  The drafters of the 2003 PROTECT (Prosecutorial 
Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today) Act 
passed § 2423(c) because they feared that the need to prove intent under 
§ 2423(b) prevented prosecutors from aggressively prosecuting sex 
offenders.9  But this fear is proving unfounded because of the ways in 
which modern investigatory techniques, Federal Rule of Evidence 414, and 
the increasingly frequent admission of expert testimony in child sex 
exploitation cases have affected criminal trial practice. 
Finally, Part IV summarizes the arguments contained in Parts II–III 
and comments briefly on the significance of settling the issues discussed 
therein.  In an era of globalization, Congress’s increasing attempts to exert 
its reach extraterritorially require courts to be able to engage in informed 
discussions regarding Congress’s constitutional authority to criminalize 
citizens’ overseas conduct. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. TRACKING THE ORIGINS AND OPERATION OF SECTION 2423(C) 
Section 2423(c) was one of a number of provisions enacted in 2003 as 
part of the PROTECT Act, a comprehensive piece of federal legislation 
designed to address the growing concern over child pornography, sex 
tourism, and other forms of sexual exploitation of children.10  It is one of 
 
opened for signature May 25, 2000, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 106-37, 2171 U.N.T.S. 227 
(entered into force Jan. 18, 2002); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920). 
8 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) (emphasis added). 
9 See infra text accompanying notes 30–36. 
10 S. REP. NO. 108-2, at 1–2 (2003) (explaining that the purposes of the PROTECT Act 
were “to restore the government’s ability to prosecute child pornography offenses 
successfully” and to “accomplish several other changes in existing law to aid in the 
investigation and prosecution of child pornography offenses, such as creating extraterritorial 
jurisdiction”); 149 CONG. REC. 445–46 (2003) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch) (summarizing 
the PROTECT Act and its goals); 149 CONG. REC. 9079 (2003) (statement of Rep. Sue 
Myrick) (“The PROTECT Act sends a clear message to those who prey upon children that if 
they commit these crimes, they will be punished.  This legislation provides stronger penalties 
against kidnapping, ensures lifetime supervision of sexual offenders and kidnappers of 
children, gives law enforcement the tools it needs to effectively prosecute these crimes, and 
provides assistance to the community when a child is abducted.”). 
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four related provisions, sometimes called the “travel statutes,”11 that 
criminalize travel in interstate or foreign commerce that is connected to 
sexual abuse.12 
The first of the other three provisions, § 2421, criminalizes 
transporting an individual in interstate or foreign commerce with the intent 
that the individual engage in prostitution or any other criminal sexual 
activity.13  The current version of § 2421 originated in 1910 as the Mann 
Act, once known as the White-Slave Traffic Act.14  The purpose behind the 
Mann Act was “to protect women who were weak from men who were 
bad,”15 although its scope has since expanded.16  The second provision, 
§ 2423(a), criminalizes transporting a minor in interstate or foreign 
commerce with the intent that the minor engage in prostitution or any other 
criminal sexual activity.17  The third, § 2423(b), criminalizes traveling in 
interstate or foreign commerce for the purpose of engaging in any illicit 
sexual conduct, as defined by statute.18 
Section 2423(c) criminalizes traveling in foreign commerce and 
engaging in illicit sexual conduct.19  Illicit sexual conduct is defined in 
§ 2423(f) as: 
(1) [A] sexual act (as defined in section 2246) with a person under 18 years of age that 
would be in violation of chapter 109A if the sexual act occurred in the special 
maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States; or (2) any commercial sex 
 
11 See VIRGINIA M. KENDALL & T. MARKUS FUNK, CHILD EXPLOITATION AND 
TRAFFICKING: EXAMINING THE GLOBAL CHALLENGES AND U.S. RESPONSES 91–107 (2012). 
12 United States v. McGuire, 627 F.3d 622, 623–24 (7th Cir. 2010). 
13 18 U.S.C. § 2421. 
14 See White-Slave Traffic (Mann) Act, ch. 395, 36 Stat. 825 (1910) (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421–24 (2006)); McGuire, 627 F.3d at 624.  The original Mann 
Act criminalized, inter alia, transporting in interstate or foreign commerce, “any woman or 
girl for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose, or with 
the intent and purpose to induce, entice, or compel such woman or girl to become a prostitute 
or to give herself up to debauchery.”  Mann Act, 36 Stat. at 825. 
15 Wyatt v. United States, 362 U.S. 525, 530 (1960) (quoting Denning v. United States, 
247 F. 463, 465 (5th Cir. 1918)). 
It was in response to shocking revelations of subjugation of women too weak to resist that 
Congress acted. . . .  As the legislative history discloses, the Act reflects the supposition that the 
women with whom it sought to deal often had no independent will of their own, and embodies, 
in effect, the view that they must be protected against themselves. 
Id. at 530 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 61-47, at 10–11 (1910)). 
16 Compare Mann Act, 36 Stat. 825 (focusing on transporting women and girls for 
“prostitution or debauchery”), with 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (focusing on transporting anyone for 
any criminal sex offenses). 
17 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a). 
18 Id. § 2423(b). 
19 Id. § 2423(c). 
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act (as defined in section 1591) with a person under 18 years of age.20 
The combination of § 2423(c) and (f)(2) criminalizes, in a nutshell, giving 
or receiving anything of value in exchange for any sex act with a minor.21  
This combination is known as the “commercial prong” of the sex tourism 
statute.22  The combination of § 2423(c) and (f)(1) criminalizes the sexual 
abuse of minors.23  This combination is known as the “noncommercial 
prong” of the sex tourism statute.24 
The purpose of 2003’s PROTECT Act was to “give[] law enforcement 
authorities valuable new tools to deter, detect, investigate, prosecute, and 
punish crimes against America’s children.”25  In addition to drafting new 
provisions increasing prosecutors’ ability to track and collect evidence 
against child pornographers, the PROTECT Act substantially revised 
18 U.S.C. § 2423.26  The PROTECT Act replaced the then-current version 
of § 2423(b) with § 2423(b)–(g).27  The revision left § 2423(b) substantially 
intact,28 but added § 2423(c) (“Engaging in illicit sexual conduct in foreign 
places”), § 2423(d) (“Ancillary offenses,” i.e., “arrang[ing], induc[ing], 
procur[ing], or facilitat[ing] the travel of a person knowing that such a 
person is traveling in interstate or foreign commerce for the purpose of 
engaging in illicit sexual conduct”), § 2423(e) (“Attempt and conspiracy”), 
§ 2423(f) (defining “illicit sexual conduct”), and § 2423(g) (providing an 
affirmative defense to certain charges under this statute).29 
 
20 Id. § 2423(f).  Per 18 U.S.C. § 2246(2): 
[T]he term “sexual act” means—(A) contact between the penis and the vulva or the penis and the 
anus, and for purposes of this subparagraph contact involving the penis occurs upon penetration, 
however slight; (B) contact between the mouth and the penis, the mouth and the vulva, or the 
mouth and the anus; (C) the penetration, however slight, of the anal or genital opening of another 
by a hand or finger or by any object, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or 
arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person; or (D) the intentional touching, not through the 
clothing, of the genitalia of another person who has not attained the age of 16 years with an 
intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person. 
Chapter 109A criminalizes: aggravated sexual abuse (id. § 2241); sexual abuse (id. § 2242); 
sexual abuse of a minor or ward (id. § 2243); and abusive sexual conduct (id. § 2244). 
21 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591(e)(3), 2423(c), 2423(f)(2). 
22 See United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1109–10 (9th Cir. 2006). 
23 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241–48, 2423(c), 2423(f)(1). 
24 See Clark, 435 F.3d at 1109–10. 
25 Presidential Statement on Signing the PROTECT Act of 2003, 39 WEEKLY COMP. 
PRES. DOC. 504 (Apr. 30, 2003). 
26 See PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, sec. 105(a), § 2423, 117 Stat. 650, 653–54 
(2003) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2423 (2006)). 
27 See id. 
28 The conspiracy prong of the old version of § 2423(b) was moved to § 2423(e) of the 
new version.  Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) (2000), with sec. 105(a), 117 Stat. at 654. 
29 Sec. 105(a), 117 Stat. at 653–54. 
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The primary effect of adding § 2423(c) was to remove one of the 
greatest barriers to enforcement of § 2423(b)—the requirement that 
prosecutors prove that mens rea existed prior to travel.30  Under the 
precursor to § 2423(c)—the pre-2003 version of § 2423(b)31—a prosecutor 
had to prove that a defendant formed the intent to engage in illicit sexual 
activity prior to his travel in interstate or foreign commerce.32 
The PROTECT Act eliminated this intent requirement.33  The 
conference report regarding the Act stated, “Current law requires the 
government to prove that the defendant traveled with the intent to engage in 
the illegal activity.  Under [§ 2423(c)], the government would only have to 
prove that the defendant engaged in illicit sexual conduct with a minor 
while in a foreign country.”34  In other words, a defendant could be 
prosecuted for traveling to a foreign country and engaging in illicit sex in 
violation of § 2423(c), even if he had no preconceived intent to do so.35  
Thus, the elements that prosecutors now need to prove under § 2423(c) are: 
(1) that the defendant is either a U.S. citizen or an alien admitted to the 
United States for permanent residence; (2) that the defendant traveled in 
foreign commerce; and (3) that while the defendant was in the foreign 
place, he engaged in illicit sexual conduct with another person.36 
 
30 Congress first attempted to eliminate the need for prosecutors to prove the intent 
element in sex tourism cases in the Sex Tourism Prohibition Improvement Act (STPIA), 
which was proposed, but not passed, in 2002.  Clark, 435 F.3d. at 1104 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 
107-525, at 2–3 (2002)).  The STPIA would have added a statute to the books that 
criminalized illicit sexual activities while abroad, regardless of whether the defendant had 
formed the intent to do so prior to traveling overseas.  H.R. REP. NO. 107-525, at 2–3 (2002).  
Although the STPIA failed, the PROTECT Act, proposed just a year later, adopted its 
language nearly verbatim in § 2423(c).  Compare id. at 2–3, with H.R. REP. NO. 108-66, at 5 
(2003) (Conf. Rep.). 
31 PROTECT Act, sec. 105(a), § 2423, 117 Stat. at 653–54 (describing the changes to the 
existing statute). 
32 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) (2000) (amended 2003). 
33 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c) (2006). 
34 H.R. REP. NO. 108-66, at 51 (2003) (Conf. Rep.); see also United States v. Martinez, 
599 F. Supp. 2d 784, 803 (W.D. Tex. 2009). 
35 Id. 
36 See, e.g., Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions of the Seventh Circuit 635 (2012) 
[hereinafter 7th Cir. PJI]; Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions 11th Cir. § 93.3 (2010) 
[hereinafter 11th Cir. PJI].  “To ‘travel in foreign commerce’ means that the defendant 
moved from a place within the United States to a place outside the United States.”  11th Cir. 
PJI, supra, § 93.3.  “[I]llicit sexual conduct” means: (1) “causing a person under 18 years of 
age to engage in a sexual act by using force or placing that person in fear that any person 
will be subjected to death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping”; (2) “a sexual act with a 
person under 18 years of age after rendering that person unconscious or administering a 
drug, intoxicant, or other substance that substantially impairs a person”; (3) “a sexual act 
with a person who is under 16 years of age and is at least four years younger than the 
defendant”; or (4) “a commercial sex act with a person under 18 years of age.”  Id. 
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The PROTECT Act did not include a jurisdictional statement,37 and 
the legislative history surrounding its passage makes no explicit reference 
to a constitutional provision giving Congress the power to pass such wide-
sweeping legislation.  By contrast, the Sex Tourism Prohibition 
Improvement Act (STPIA), a precursor to the PROTECT Act that was 
proposed but not passed in 2002, included a “Constitutional Authority 
Statement” grounding Congress’s authority to pass the law in its power to 
regulate commerce under Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution.38  
When Congress enacted the PROTECT Act instead of the STPIA, it 
neglected to include a similar statement of constitutional authority.39  
Nevertheless, courts that have considered the constitutionality of the 
PROTECT Act appear to have assumed that the Commerce Clause and, in 
the case of § 2423(c), the Foreign Commerce Clause, authorized Congress 
to pass the Act.40 
B. OBSERVING § 2423(C)’S NONCOMMERCIAL PRONG IN ACTION: THE 
PROSECUTION OF THOMAS PENDLETON 
On July 24, 2008, Thomas S. Pendleton, a Pennsylvania native and 
 
37 The Ninth Circuit recognized this in United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1104 (9th 
Cir. 2006). 
38 H.R. REP. NO. 107-525, at 5 (2002).   
39 The proponents of the preconference version of Senate Bill 151, which proposed 
amendments and additions to existing child pornography laws that would eventually become 
part of the PROTECT Act, did spend a great deal of time discussing the constitutionality of 
the proposed laws.  However, they focused exclusively on the portions of the statute that 
were responding to Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002), a Supreme 
Court case that implicated the First Amendment in child pornography prosecutions.  See 149 
CONG. REC. 448–50 (2003) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy).  In particular, Senator Leahy 
discussed the steps the Senate Committee on the Judiciary had taken to ensure that the 
reforms to the child pornography prosecution laws were constitutional in light of Free 
Speech Coalition.  See id. at 449 (“At our hearing . . . Constitutional and criminal law 
scholars—one of whom was the same person who warned us last time that [previous 
legislation] would be struck down—stated that the PROTECT Act as introduced in the last 
Congress could withstand Constitutional scrutiny, although there were parts that were very 
close to the line.”); see also id. at 445 (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch) (“We must now act 
quickly to repair our child pornography laws to provide for effective law enforcement in a 
manner that accords with the Court’s ruling.”).  There was no discussion of the 
constitutionality of the sex tourism statutes once they were added in the conference report.  
Cf. H.R. REP. NO. 108-66 (2003) (Conf. Rep.); 149 CONG. REC. 9079–96 (relaying testimony 
regarding the conference report before the House of Representatives). 
40 See, e.g., United States v. Pendleton, 658 F.3d 299, 308–311 (3d Cir. 2011); see also 
Clark, 435 F.3d at 1103; United States v. Bredimus, 352 F.3d 200, 204–08 (5th Cir. 2003); 
United States v. Flath, 845 F. Supp. 2d 951, 954–57  (E.D. Wis. 2012); United States v. 
Martinez, 599 F. Supp. 2d 784, 808 (W.D. Tex. 2009); United States v. Bianchi, No. 06-19, 
2007 WL 1521123, at *4–5 (E.D. Pa. May 22, 2007). 
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U.S. citizen, was indicted by a federal grand jury under § 2423(c).41  
Pendleton was tried on that indictment in the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Delaware in September 2009.42  The facts adduced at 
Pendleton’s trial told a disturbing story of child sexual exploitation.43  In 
late November 2005, Pendleton traveled from Philadelphia to Germany.44  
Shortly after arriving in Germany, Pendleton met a fourteen-year-old boy 
named Dieter.45  Dieter resided at a group home because his father passed 
away and his mother was too ill to raise him.46  Pendleton and Dieter struck 
up a friendship, corresponding through letters and postcards.47 
Throughout early 2006, Pendleton made occasional visits to Dieter at 
his group home.48  In the summer of 2006, Pendleton invited Dieter to go 
on an overnight biking and camping trip with him.49  Dieter agreed.50  On 
the second night of the trip, while Pendleton and Dieter were in their shared 
tent, Pendleton initiated sexual contact with Dieter.51  Dieter pushed 
Pendleton away and ran out of the tent.52  Dieter went to the campsite 
manager’s home, and the manager called Dieter’s custodians, who picked 
him up and took him back to the group home.53  Until Pendleton was tried, 
Dieter’s only subsequent contact with Pendleton was a letter that Dieter 
received.54 
 
41 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c); United States v. Pendleton, No. 08-111, 2009 WL 330965, at *1 
(D. Del. Feb. 11, 2009). 
42 Transcript of Record at 1, 336–38, United States v. Pendleton, No. 08-111 (D. Del. 
Jan. 20, 2010). 
43 See generally id. 
44 News Release, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Delaware Child Predator 
Sentenced to 30 Years in Federal Prison: The Man Was Convicted by a Jury on Sex Tourism 
and Failure to Register Charges (Feb. 4, 2010), available at http://www.ice.gov/news/
releases/1002/100204wilmington.htm [hereinafter Delaware Child Predator Sentenced]. 
45 Transcript of Record, supra note 42, at 96–97.  Although the victim had turned 
eighteen by the time of his testimony, I have chosen to use a pseudonym in this Comment for 
privacy purposes. 
46 Id. at 92. 
47 Id. at 99.  Dieter testified that he thought it was “exciting” to get postcards from 
Pendleton.  Id. at 108.  He said he received postcards depicting Rockefeller Place in New 
York and Independence Hall in Philadelphia, among other landmarks.  Id. 
48 Id. at 99. 
49 Id. at 108–09. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 115–18. 
52 Id. at 120. 
53 Id. at 126, 130. 
54 Id. at 130–31.  Police found what was presumably a draft of the letter, dated May 29, 
2006, on Pendleton’s computer when he was arrested.  It read, in part:  
My Dear Dieter: I need to write to you to express my great sorrow and sadness that my 
thoughtless and insensitive actions have caused you so much pain.  What I had intended to be a 
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Pendleton argued in pretrial proceedings that the noncommercial prong 
of § 2423(c) was “facially unconstitutional because it exceeds congressional 
authority under the Foreign Commerce Clause of the United States 
Constitution.”55  Pendleton’s arguments were unavailing.56  The Pendleton 
district court found that § 2423(c) was well within Congress’s power to 
regulate foreign commerce.57  Pendleton was convicted at the subsequent 
jury trial.58  Relying heavily on Pendleton’s prior convictions for sexually 
abusing children, the district court judge sentenced Pendleton to the 
statutory maximum of thirty years in prison and a lifetime of supervised 
release.59  On appeal to the Third Circuit, Pendleton again attacked the 
constitutionality of the noncommercial prong of § 2423(c).60  On September 
7, 2011, the Third Circuit upheld § 2423(c) and affirmed Pendleton’s 
conviction.61 
Pendleton’s case—though clearly a distressing example of child sex 
exploitation—seems relatively unremarkable upon initial examination.  
According to Department of Justice statistics, he was one of 1,916 suspects 
arrested in the same reporting year for nonviolent sex offenses.62  Even the 
 
gesture and action to signify a friendship and love was carried too far and clearly shocked and 
frightened you.  This result is the exact opposite of what I had intended, which was to reassure 
you of my feelings for you and to help deepen the bond between us, as well as to relax you and 
make you feel better and more comfortable . . . .  I conclude by repeating how sorry I am that I 
have been the cause of such pain, and that I hope you can get over this, to recover and to be 
strengthened by the experience and that sometime you will be able to forgive me and accept me 
as your friend, loving and trustworthy.  With deep regret but with real hope, your once and future 
friend. 
Id. at 271–74. 
55 United States v. Pendleton, No. 08-111-GMS, 2009 WL 330965, at *2 (D. Del. Feb. 
11, 2009). 
56 Id. at *6. 
57 Id. at *3–4; see infra text accompanying notes 107–109, 122–125. 
58 United States v. Pendleton, 658 F.3d 299, 302 (3d Cir. 2011). 
59 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c) (2006).  Pendleton has a long and unsympathetic history of 
sexually abusing young boys.  Delaware Child Predator Sentenced, supra note 44.  In 1981, 
he was convicted by a Michigan court for molesting an eleven-year-old while serving as a 
church camp counselor.  Id.  In a 1992 New Jersey case, he was convicted of sexual assault, 
attempted aggravated sexual assault of a minor, and endangering the welfare of a child in a 
case involving sexual abuse of a twelve-year-old boy on biking trips in Virginia and New 
Jersey.  Id.  In 2001, he was convicted by the government of the Republic of Latvia of 
sexually abusing both a nine-year-old child and a thirteen-year-old child over the span of six 
months.  Id. 
60 Pendleton, 658 F.3d at 302. 
61 Id. at 311. 
62 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
2008—STATISTICAL TABLES 17 tbl.4.1 (2010), available at www.bjs.gov/content/pub/html/
fjsst/2008/fjs08st.pdf.  A nonviolent sex offense includes, inter alia, “transporting an 
individual (including minors) from one place to another in interstate or foreign commerce 
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result is unsurprising—95.6% of nonviolent sex offense cases terminated in 
the same reporting year as Pendleton’s resulted in convictions.63  There was 
minimal media coverage of Pendleton’s trial and conviction.  Yet 
Pendleton’s case was significant because it presented the first opportunity 
for federal appellate review of the constitutionality of the noncommercial 
prong of § 2423(c), potentially setting the stage for Supreme Court review 
of the issue.64 
C. ANALYZING THE DIVERGENT INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FOREIGN 
COMMERCE CLAUSE 
The Foreign Commerce Clause is part of Article I, Section 8 of the 
U.S. Constitution: “The Congress shall have power . . . [t]o regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the 
Indian Tribes.”65  This clause actually contains three concepts: the Foreign 
Commerce Clause (“[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations”), the 
Interstate Commerce Clause (“[t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the 
several States”), and the Indian Commerce Clause (“[t]o regulate 
Commerce . . . with the Indian Tribes”). 
The Foreign Commerce Clause is largely unexplored territory for 
 
with the intent and purpose of engaging in prostitution, or any sexual activity for which any 
person can be charged with a criminal offense.”  Id. at 64. 
63 MARK MOTIVANS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2009—
STATISTICAL TABLES 18 tbl.4.2 (2012), available at http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fjs09
st.pdf.  Of those who went to trial, sixty-two were convicted and only four were acquitted.  
Id. 
64 Other defendants have been charged under the noncommercial prong of § 2423(c), but 
most of them have pleaded guilty.  See, e.g., United States v. Rudd, 662 F.3d 1257, 1259 
(9th Cir. 2011); United States v. Prowler, 320 F. App’x 721, 721 (9th Cir. 2009); United 
States v. Castellon, 213 F. App’x 732, 733 (10th Cir. 2007); United States v. Bollea, 144 F. 
App’x 69, 70 (11th Cir. 2005).  At least one defendant has been convicted under this prong, 
but he has not appealed his sentence.  See United States v. Martinez, 599 F. Supp. 2d 784, 
803 (W.D. Tex. 2009).  Reviewing Pendleton would also give the Supreme Court the 
opportunity to address a second important issue concerning prosecutions of citizens’ 
overseas conduct—which criminal venue statute should be used in such cases.  The Second 
and Ninth Circuits refuse to apply 18 U.S.C. § 3238 (which applies to offenses not 
committed in any U.S. judicial district) unless the offense charged was committed entirely 
outside of the United States.  See United States v. Pace, 314 F.3d 344, 351 (9th Cir. 2002); 
United States v. Gilboe, 684 F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 1982).  The Third, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits 
apply § 3238 where some conduct occurs in the United States and some conduct occurs 
overseas.  Pendleton, 658 F.3d at 305; United States v. Levy Auto Parts, 787 F.2d 946, 950, 
952 (4th Cir. 1986); United States v. Erwin, 602 F.2d 1183, 1185 (5th Cir. 1979).  This 
circuit split implicates a defendant’s constitutional rights to have his trial “held in the State 
where the said crimes shall have been committed” and to be heard by a “jury of the state and 
the district wherein the crime shall have been committed,” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 & amend. 
VI, and deserves attention from the Supreme Court. 
65 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (emphasis added). 
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jurists and commentators,66 especially relative to its cousin, the Interstate 
Commerce Clause.  However, as travel between the United States and 
foreign nations becomes a frequent reality for more and more U.S. citizens, 
the extent of the U.S. government’s authority to criminalize the activities of 
citizens abroad takes on increasing importance.67  Cases attacking the 
constitutionality of § 2423(b) and (c) present an ideal opportunity to explore 
the constitutional justification for criminal legislation explicitly designed to 
apply extraterritorially.  Most challenges to § 2423(b) and (c) have invoked 
the Foreign Commerce Clause.68  Defendants often argue that these 
criminal provisions fall outside of Congress’s constitutional authority “[t]o 
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations.”69 
No clear test exists for evaluating the constitutionality of criminal laws 
passed pursuant to Congress’s Foreign Commerce Clause authority.70  Out 
of the murkiness, it is possible to discern three general analytical 
frameworks.  First, some courts have relied on Interstate Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence and applied the tests articulated in United States v. Lopez and 
its progeny to the Foreign Commerce Clause context.71  Those courts treat 
the United States and the relevant foreign nation as sister-states and 
consider whether the statute would be a valid exercise of Congress’s 
Commerce Clause power in the interstate context.72  If the statute would 
 
66 Anthony J. Colangelo, The Foreign Commerce Clause, 96 VA. L. REV. 949, 950 
(2010) (“[T]he Foreign Commerce Clause has received little sustained analytical 
attention.”); Julie Buffington, Comment, Taking the Ball and Running with It: U.S. v. Clark 
and Congress’s Unlimited Power Under the Foreign Commerce Clause, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 
841, 842 (2006). 
67 Colangelo, supra note 66, at 951.  Indeed, as Professor Colangelo notes, recent hubbub 
regarding the Foreign Commerce Clause has led to a spate of student notes and comments 
analyzing the case of Michael Clark, see United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100 (9th Cir. 
2006), and making tentative forays into analyses of the Foreign Commerce Clause.  Id. at 
949, 951 n.5.  Perhaps Professor Colangelo’s expansive article on the history, doctrinal 
development, and current application of the Foreign Commerce Clause is the best evidence 
of the increasing importance of the Foreign Commerce Clause to assessing the 
constitutionality of congressional action. 
68 See supra note 40. 
69 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
70 See infra text accompanying notes 82–147; see also Buffington, supra note 66, at 846 
(“[N]o clear guidelines for determining the constitutionality of a statute that restricts a U.S. 
citizen’s conduct in foreign commerce have emerged.”).  This lack of clarity applies only to 
Congress’s positive authority; the proper test for evaluating whether state action violates the 
dormant Foreign Commerce Clause is well settled, but extensive discussion thereof is 
beyond the scope of this Comment.  See Japan Line, Ltd. v. Cnty. of L.A., 441 U.S. 434 
(1979). 
71 See, e.g., United States v. Bredimus, 352 F.3d 200, 205 (5th Cir. 2003); United States 
v. Martinez, 599 F. Supp. 2d 784, 805–09 (W.D. Tex. 2009). 
72 See, e.g., Bredimus, 352 F.3d at 205; Martinez, 599 F. Supp. 2d at 805–09. 
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survive constitutional scrutiny in that instance, it survives constitutional 
scrutiny under this approach to Foreign Commerce Clause interpretation.73 
The second analytical framework also starts with Interstate Commerce 
Clause case law, but it is heavily influenced by dormant Foreign Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence.74  Courts that apply this framework find that 
precedential treatment of the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause—which 
concerns the states’ authority to regulate foreign commerce in the absence 
of federal action—gives Congress “broad and plenary” authority to legislate 
in the foreign commerce arena.75  Because these courts have found that 
Congress’s power is greater under the Foreign Commerce Clause than the 
Interstate Commerce Clause,76 they may be more inclined to find that 
§ 2423(b) and (c) are valid enactments, even if a strict application of Lopez 
and its progeny would not support such a finding in the interstate context. 
The third analytical framework also starts with Lopez.  Instead of 
combining Lopez with dormant Foreign Commerce Clause case law, 
however, the commentators and individual judges77 whose analyses fall into 
this third category combine Lopez with sovereignty and international law 
concerns in arriving at their Foreign Commerce Clause tests.78  Proponents 
of this approach have found that the scope of Congress’s Foreign 
Commerce Clause authority is narrower than the scope of its Interstate 
Commerce Clause authority.79  Thus, they would examine statutes 
purporting to criminalize citizens’ conduct abroad more stringently than 
they would statutes regulating interstate behavior.80  This Comment 
ultimately argues that a version of this third analytical framework is the 
most appropriate test for considering a criminal statute’s constitutionality 
under the Foreign Commerce Clause.81 
1. First Analytical Framework: The Lopez Categories 
All three of the analytical frameworks that courts and commentators 
have used to assess Foreign Commerce Clause cases rely, at their core, on 
the currently reigning Interstate Commerce Clause test.  In order for a 
 
73 Bredimus, 352 F.3d at 205; Martinez, 599 F. Supp. 2d at 805–09. 
74 See Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 453–54 (considering the constitutionality of a state statute 
purporting to regulate foreign commerce). 
75 United States v. Pendleton, No. 08-111-GMS, 2009 WL 330965, at *3–4 (D. Del. Feb. 
11, 2009) (citing United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1114 (9th Cir. 2006)). 
76 See, e.g., Pendleton, 2009 WL 330965, at *6; Clark, 435 F.3d at 1111, 1113, 1116. 
77 No U.S. district court or U.S. court of appeals majority has applied this framework. 
78 See, e.g., Colangelo, supra note 66; Buffington, supra note 66. 
79 See infra Part II.C.3. 
80 See infra Part II.C.3. 
81 See infra Part III.A. 
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statute to be within Congress’s Interstate Commerce Clause powers, it must 
regulate one of the “three broad categories of activity” set forth in United 
States v. Lopez: (1) “the channels of interstate commerce”; (2) “the 
instrumentalities of interstate commerce”; or (3) “those activities having a 
substantial relation to interstate commerce, i.e., those activities that 
substantially affect interstate commerce.”82  Further, the conduct that the 
statute at issue seeks to regulate must be economic in nature.83 
A number of courts have directly applied this Interstate Commerce 
Clause test to cases decided under the Foreign Commerce Clause by 
treating the United States and the relevant foreign nation as if they were 
sister-states.84  For example, in United States v. Bredimus, the defendant 
traveled from Texas to Thailand, via Hong Kong and Tokyo, in 2001.85  His 
trip had a dual purpose: first, to attend scheduled business meetings, and 
second, to “make videotapes and digital images of Thai children engaged in 
sexually explicit conduct.”86 
The defendant was indicted under § 2423(b) and moved to dismiss the 
indictment, arguing that Congress exceeded its authority under the 
Commerce Clause by enacting § 2423(b).87  The Bredimus district court 
denied the defendant’s motion, finding that § 2423(b) “[did] not exceed 
Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause because Congress has the 
authority to keep the channels of foreign commerce free from immoral or 
injurious uses.”88  In affirming, the Fifth Circuit, relying on Lopez and 
Morrison, observed that other courts have upheld statutes similar to 
§ 2423(b) on a “channels of commerce” theory.89 
The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas has 
also applied Interstate Commerce Clause precedent in the Foreign 
Commerce Clause context.  In United States v. Martinez, the twenty-year-
 
82 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995) (internal citations omitted). 
83 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000). 
84 E.g., United States v. Bredimus, 352 F.3d 200, 204–06 (5th Cir. 2003); United States 
v. Martinez, 599 F. Supp. 2d 784, 790–91 (W.D. Tex. 2009). 
85 Bredimus, 352 F.3d at 202. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 203. 
89 Bredimus, 352 F.3d at 207–08.  The Fifth Circuit noted, but did not rely on, its opinion 
that “the deference accorded to Congress [is] more compelling when, as here, the commerce 
at issue is foreign, as opposed to interstate.”  Id.  The court referred to United States v. Von 
Foelkel, 136 F.3d 339, 341 (2d Cir. 1998) (upholding 18 U.S.C. § 2262(a)(1)); United States 
v. Bailey, 112 F.3d 758, 766 (4th Cir. 1997) (upholding 18 U.S.C. § 2261(a)); and United 
States v. Wright, 128 F.3d 1274, 1276 (8th Cir. 1997) (upholding 18 U.S.C. § 2262(a)(1)).  
The Third Circuit panel that decided United States v. Pendleton also upheld § 2423(c) 
against a Foreign Commerce Clause challenge on the “channels of commerce” theory.  658 
F.3d 299, 308–11 (3d Cir. 2011). 
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old defendant took a minor girl from her aunt’s house, led her on foot 
across a bridge from El Paso, Texas, to Juarez, Mexico, and forced her to 
have sex with him.90  The defendant was indicted for, inter alia, 
“[e]ngaging in illicit sexual conduct in foreign places, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 2423(c).”91 
The defendant moved to dismiss the charges against him, arguing that 
§ 2423(c) was unconstitutional because it was outside the scope of 
Congress’s Foreign Commerce Clause authority.92  The Western District of 
Texas held that § 2423(c) passed constitutional muster.93  Instead of relying 
on the “channels of commerce” theory that the Bredimus court applied, the 
Martinez court relied on the “substantially affects” prong of Lopez.94  It 
found that there was “a rational basis for concluding that leaving non-
commercial sex with minors outside of federal control could affect the price 
for child prostitution services and other market conditions in the child 
prostitution industry.”95 
Not all judges who have considered the constitutionality of the 
noncommercial prong of § 2423(c) under this analytical framework 
concluded that it is constitutional.  Judge Roth dissented from the portion of 
the majority opinion in United States v. Bianchi upholding § 2423(c) 
against a Commerce Clause challenge.  Applying Lopez, he opined that 
“criminalizing non-commercial activity abroad exceeds Congress’s power 
under the Foreign Commerce Clause.”96  Judge Roth found that there was 
“no rational basis to conclude that an illicit sex act with a minor undertaken 
on foreign soil, perhaps years after legal travel and devoid of any exchange 
of value, substantially affects foreign commerce.”97  By removing the intent 
requirement in the 2003 amendments to § 2423(b), Congress “severed any 
jurisdictional tie to the prohibited activity.”98  “Vesting Congress with such 
a general international police power,” Judge Roth reasoned, “would violate 
both [the defendant’s] constitutional rights and the limited nature of our 
federal government.”99 
 
90 United States v. Martinez, 599 F. Supp. 2d 784, 790–91 (W.D. Tex. 2009). 
91 Id. at 791. 
92 Id. at 791–92. 
93 Id. at 808. 
94 Id. 
95 Id.  The Martinez court noted in a throwaway comment that federal courts have given 
Congress “almost complete deference” when “enacting laws regulating foreign commerce,” 
but did not appear to rely on the expanded authority the way other courts have.  Id. 
96 United States v. Bianchi, 386 F. App’x 156, 163 (3d Cir. 2010) (Roth, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 164. 
99 Id. 
2013] THE NONCOMMERCIAL PRONG OF 18 U.S.C. § 2423(C) 963 
In sum, courts that graft the Lopez framework directly onto the Foreign 
Commerce Clause analysis do two things: First, they determine whether the 
conduct regulated fits within one of Lopez’s definitions of “commerce.”  
Then, they consider whether there is a rational basis to believe that the 
statute actually does regulate one of the three categories of “commerce.”  
Some courts have used this framework to uphold § 2423(b) and (c) against 
facial challenges.100  It is also the basis for the two alternative analytical 
approaches described infra.  Both use the Lopez Interstate Commerce 
Clause test as a jumping-off point for their respective Foreign Commerce 
Clause tests. 
2. Second Analytical Framework: Combining Lopez with Dormant 
Commerce Clause Jurisprudence to Justify Increased Congressional 
Authority Under the Foreign Commerce Clause 
Some courts have found that Congress’s power to regulate conduct 
under the Foreign Commerce Clause is greater than its power under the 
Interstate Commerce Clause.101  The reasoning behind this approach is 
relatively consistent across the courts that apply it.  The analysis usually 
involves at least two of the following three arguments: First, the commerce 
power is separated into three distinct sections—the Interstate Commerce 
Clause, the Foreign Commerce Clause, and the Indian Commerce Clause—
and there is little intrasentence unity in the constitutional phrasing.102  
Second, the original intent of the Framers was to grant Congress broader 
authority in regulating foreign commerce than interstate commerce, because 
the unique federalist concerns of the fledgling nation limited the federal 
government’s authority only vis-à-vis the states.103  Finally, the courts 
consider as binding authority a long and relatively settled line of dormant 
Foreign Commerce Clause cases from Gibbons v. Ogden through Japan 
Line Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, which tend to suggest that Congress has 
broad power.104 
 
100 See id. at 156; United States v. Bredimus, 352 F.3d 200 (5th Cir. 2003); Martinez, 
599 F. Supp. 2d at 784; see also Buffington, supra note 66, at 846 & n.38 (collecting cases). 
101 See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1103 (9th Cir. 2006); United States 
v. Pendleton, No. 08-111-GMS, 2009 WL 330965, at *3 (D. Del. Feb. 11, 2009). 
102 See, e.g., Nicholas Christophilos, Comment, Constitutional Law—Prosecutorial 
Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003—Congress 
Did Not Exceed Its Constitutional Authority by Criminalizing Commercial Sex Abroad—
United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100 (9th Cir. 2006), 30 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 515, 
518 (2007). 
103 Clark, 435 F.3d at 1102–03. 
104 See, e.g., id. 
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i. Textual Interpretation 
Scholars debate the notion of intrasentence uniformity—the idea that 
words and phrases connected to each other in the Constitution ought to be 
interpreted in a way that is consistent with each other.105  Courts and 
commentators who find that the Foreign Commerce Clause and the 
Interstate Commerce Clause call for different tests believe that the 
Commerce Clause sets forth three distinct powers, each with its own unique 
meaning: “Though each clause is controlled by the same introductory 
phrase, the Framers appear to have considered the individual commerce 
powers—foreign, interstate, and Indian—as distinct subclauses, requiring 
separate analysis.”106 
For example, en route to finding that the noncommercial prong of 
§ 2423(c) was a valid exercise of Congress’s constitutional authority, the 
Third Circuit observed in Pendleton that the Foreign Commerce Clause has 
“followed its own distinct evolutionary path.”107  Deciding that the 
Interstate Commerce Clause and the Foreign Commerce Clause encapsulate 
different congressional powers allows advocates of this second analytical 
framework to decide that the “Foreign Commerce Clause is different from 
the Interstate Commerce Clause,” and therefore to move away from the 
Lopez framework.108  This belief allows courts to place fewer limits on 
Congress’s Foreign Commerce Clause authority than on its Interstate 
Commerce Clause authority.109 
ii. Original Intent—Federalism and the Need for One National Voice 
The courts and commentators who apply this second analytical 
framework also believe that the original intent of the Framers was to grant 
Congress broader authority in regulating foreign commerce than in 
regulating interstate commerce because of the unique federalist concerns of 
the early United States.  This belief has some basis in Supreme Court 
jurisprudence: “Although the Constitution, Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, grants Congress 
power to regulate commerce ‘with foreign Nations’ and ‘among the several 
 
105 Id. at 1110 (collecting scholarly articles).  See generally Saikrishna Prakash, Our 
Three Commerce Clauses and the Presumption of Intrasentence Uniformity, 55 ARK. L. REV. 
1149 (2003). 
106 Daniel Bolia, Comment, Policing Americans Abroad: The PROTECT Act, the Case 
Against Michael Lewis Clark, and the Use of the Foreign Commerce Clause in an 
Increasingly Flat World, 48 S. TEX. L. REV. 797, 804 (2007). 
107 United States v. Pendleton, 658 F.3d 299, 306 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Clark, 435 F.3d 
at 1113). 
108 Clark, 435 F.3d at 1110–11. 
109 Id. at 1111 (“[T]he Supreme Court has read the Foreign Commerce Clause as granting 
Congress sweeping powers.”). 
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States’ in parallel phrases, there is evidence that the Founders intended the 
scope of the foreign commerce power to be the greater.”110 
The thrust of this argument is that Foreign Commerce Clause cases are 
free from the “[f]ederalism and state sovereignty concerns” that led courts 
to limit Congress’s authority to pass laws pursuant to its Interstate 
Commerce Clause power.111  In other words, Interstate Commerce Clause 
cases implicate the argument that the continued existence of the federal 
system depends upon “some appraisal and accommodation of the 
competing demands of the state and national interests involved.”112  Foreign 
Commerce Clause cases lack these federalism concerns; therefore, these 
courts and commentators argue, the rationale behind restricting federal 
power in the interstate context simply does not apply in the Foreign 
Commerce Clause domain.113 
Further, proponents of this second analytical framework often draw on 
a related originalist argument that the Framers intended Congress’s 
authority under the Foreign Commerce Clause to be far-reaching so that the 
United States could speak with one voice in foreign affairs.  One 
commentator sought to prove that “the Founders intended Congress to 
have—and the Supreme Court has interpreted the Constitution as 
providing—broader powers in the realm of foreign commerce than in 
commerce between the states.”114  He argued for increased congressional 
authority in foreign affairs because the Constitution emerged, in part, out of 
a need for a uniform, federal voice to speak for the new nation in issues 
involving commerce with foreign nations.115  Ultimately, the argument 
goes, the result of combining the Interstate Commerce Clause test with the 
absence of federalism concerns and “the necessity that the nation speak 
with one voice” is that “any statute that would be granted constitutional 
deference when it regulates interstate commerce is accorded even greater 
deference when Congress is regulating foreign commerce.”116 
iii. Doctrinal Development of the Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause 
Courts and authors in this second framework have also analyzed 
dormant Foreign Commerce Clause jurisprudence and concluded that it 
 
110 Japan Line, Ltd. v. Cnty. of L.A., 441 U.S. 434, 448 (1979) (citing, inter alia, THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 279–83 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)). 
111 Clark, 435 F.3d at 1113. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 Bolia, supra note 106, at 802–03. 
115 Id. at 803. 
116 United States v. Martinez, 599 F. Supp. 2d 784, 805 (W.D. Tex. 2009) (citing United 
States v. Bredimus, 352 F.3d 200, 208 (5th Cir. 2003)). 
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supports the proposition that Congress has broad authority to regulate in the 
foreign commerce arena.  The Supreme Court’s dormant Foreign 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence dates back to 1824 and Gibbons v. Ogden, 
which held that the Foreign Commerce Clause “comprehend[s] every 
species of commercial intercourse between the United States and foreign 
nations.”117 
Later courts put flesh on the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause 
skeleton articulated by Gibbons, most notably in Japan Line.118  Japan Line 
considered whether a state tax could be imposed on instrumentalities of 
foreign commerce.119  The County of Los Angeles argued that the 
Commerce Clause analysis should be identical regardless of whether the 
commerce at issue was foreign or interstate.120  The Supreme Court 
considered and explicitly rejected that argument, finding that “[w]hen 
construing Congress’ power to ‘regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,’ 
a more extensive constitutional inquiry is required.”121 
A number of courts, including the Pendleton district court, have relied 
on Japan Line to support giving even more deference to Congress when it 
legislates pursuant to the Foreign Commerce Clause than when it legislates 
pursuant to the Interstate Commerce Clause.122  The Pendleton district court 
first noted that “Congress is authorized to regulate the . . . three broad 
categories of activity” that are sketched out in Lopez.123  It then cited Japan 
Line for the proposition that “Congress’ power to regulate foreign 
commerce, however, is even greater than its power to regulate interstate 
commerce.”124  Without identifying a specific Lopez category that the 
conduct addressed in § 2423(c) would fall under, the Court concluded that 
under this “broad and plenary” Foreign Commerce Clause power, the 
element that a defendant travel in foreign commerce placed the statute 
“‘squarely within Congress’ authority to regulate and protect’ Foreign 
 
117 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 193 (1824). 
118 See Japan Line Ltd. v. Cnty. of L.A., 441 U.S. 434 (1979); see also Buffington, supra 
note 66, at 843–46. 
119 Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 434. 
120 Id. at 446. 
121 Id.  The Japan Line Court held that when a state sought to tax the instrumentalities of 
foreign commerce, two additional considerations—besides the usual constitutional issues—
come into play: (1) “the enhanced risk of multiple taxation”; and (2) the fact that “[f]oreign 
commerce is preeminently a matter of national concern” and “a state tax on the 
instrumentalities of foreign commerce may impair federal uniformity in an area where 
federal uniformity is essential.”  Id. at 446–48. 
122 United States v. Pendleton, No. 08-111-GMS, 2009 WL 330965, at *3–4 (D. Del. 
Feb. 11, 2009). 
123 Id. at *3. 
124 Id. (citing Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 434). 
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Commerce.”125 
The clearest example of the application of this second analytical 
framework is the Eastern District of Wisconsin’s recent decision in United 
States v. Flath.126  The Flath court briefly acknowledged that Congress’s 
powers over “Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several 
States” are contained in the same constitutional provision, but noted that the 
two powers have “significant distinctions.”127  Most importantly, “the 
interplay of federalism and state sovereignty, so prevalent in the interstate 
commerce context, is absent in the foreign commerce arena.”128  Further, 
the Flath court relied on Japan Line to find that “Congress has broader 
power to regulate commerce with foreign nations than among states.”129  
After making these initial observations, the court considered the Lopez 
categories and found that “the use of the channels and instrumentalities of 
foreign commerce is necessarily a part of the commission of the targeted 
offense,” contained in § 2423(c).130  That finding, combined with 
“Congress’s broader power to regulate foreign commerce than interstate 
commerce and the absence of federalism and state sovereignty 
considerations,” led the Flath court to find that § 2423(c) “is a proper 
regulation of persons in foreign commerce and of the uses of the channels 
of foreign commerce under Congress’s foreign commerce power.”131 
3. Third Analytical Framework: Combining Lopez with Constraining 
Originalist and Foreign Sovereignty Arguments to Restrict  
Congressional Authority 
Some commentators and individual judges—but no district courts or 
appellate majorities—have found that Congress’s power to legislate 
pursuant to the Foreign Commerce Clause is not as expansive as its power 
under the Interstate Commerce Clause.132  This approach tends to include 
one or more of the following characteristics: First, there is a textual 
argument that the language of the Commerce Clause—which regulates 
commerce “with” foreign nations but “among” the states—contemplates 
different approaches to assessing congressional authority under the Foreign 
Commerce Clause and the Interstate Commerce Clause, respectively.133  
 
125 Id. at *3–4 (citing United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1114 (9th Cir. 2006)). 
126 United States v. Flath, 845 F. Supp. 2d 951 (E.D. Wis. 2012). 
127 Id. at 954–55. 
128 Id. at 955. 
129 Id. (citing Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 448). 
130 Id. 
131 Id. at 956–57. 
132 See, e.g., Colangelo, supra note 66, at 969–70; Buffington, supra note 66, at 857–58. 
133 Colangelo, supra note 66, at 954. 
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Second, the application of dormant Foreign Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence to positive Foreign Commerce Clause cases is inapposite 
because of the starkly different factual scenarios presented by the two types 
of statutes.134  Relatedly, norms of international sovereignty require a 
greater restriction of Congress’s authority to criminalize conduct occurring 
in a foreign locale than norms of federalism require when criminalizing 
conduct occurring in the United States.135 
i. Textual Interpretation 
Proponents of this third analytical approach do not believe that 
commerce takes on a different meaning depending on its referent (foreign 
Nations, several States, or Indian Tribes).  Instead, they ascribe a consistent 
meaning to “commerce,” and therefore use the Lopez framework to define 
the three categories of commerce regulated by the Commerce Clause as a 
whole136: 
Whatever the meaning of “commerce,” it presumably has the same meaning whether 
that commerce takes place “among the states” or occurs “with foreign nations.”  
Likewise, the power to “regulate” commerce among the states presumptively is the 
same power that Congress has to “regulate” commerce with Indian tribes.  Indeed, one 
might say that there is only one power—the power to regulate commerce—that 
applies to three situations.137 
Instead of focusing on the differences between types of “commerce” or 
“regulat[ion],” the emphasis in this framework is on the differences 
between the words “among” and “with.”138  The fact that the Framers of the 
Constitution switched from “with” to “among” when talking about foreign 
nations and the states, respectively, indicates that the former is meant to 
allow Congress to regulate activity between the United States and foreign 
nations, not activity among other foreign nations or in foreign nations.139 
 
134 Id. at 953. 
135 See, e.g., Colangelo, supra note 66, at 953 (“The Foreign Commerce Clause . . . raises 
not only novel and pressing doctrinal questions, but also serious normative issues that 
habitually attend the unilateral projection of domestic law abroad by escalating the potential 
for both international friction and unfairness to individuals.”); Joanna Doerfel, Comment, 
Regulating Unsettled Issues in Latin America Under the Treaty Powers and the Foreign 
Commerce Clause, 39 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 331, 349 (2008). 
136 Colangelo, supra note 66, at 986. 
137 Prakash, supra note 105, at 1149. 
138 Colangelo, supra note 66, at 970–71. 
139 See id.  Professor Colangelo argues that the word “with” requires that there be a 
“nexus” between the conduct criminalized and the United States.  If a statute meets that 
requirement, falls into one of the Lopez categories, and respects foreign sovereignty norms, it 
is valid under the Foreign Commerce Clause.  Id. at 954–55. 
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ii. Distinguishing the Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause 
This analytical framework does not ignore or dispute the authority of 
the long line of cases establishing the federal government’s dominance in 
the area of foreign commerce.140  Rather, commentators argue that those 
cases are inapposite because they are interpretations of the dormant Foreign 
Commerce Clause; thus, they address only the states’ inability to regulate 
commerce with foreign nations (and Congress’s ability to curtail attempted 
exercises of such authority), not Congress’s constitutional authority to 
affirmatively regulate conduct.141  Lower courts have “cherry-pick[ed]” 
statements by the Supreme Court extolling the broad power of Congress in 
the foreign commerce context and, without considering whether the 
respective rationales behind the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause and 
positive Foreign Commerce Clause are consistent, used those quotations to 
uphold statutes that may actually violate the Foreign Commerce Clause.142 
The rationale behind the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause cases—
that in revenue and international trade cases, federal authority must trump 
state authority—“do[es] not exist in the context of the illicit sex acts 
statute . . . .  [T]hus, Congress should not have the same discretion to 
regulate the conduct of U.S. citizens or aliens who travel in foreign 
commerce.”143  As one commentator put it: 
[I]t makes sense for Congress to have broad power to regulate foreign trade and the 
taxation of instrumentalities of foreign commerce because of international relations 
concerns. . . .  [I]t is arguably not as important for Congress to act in a unified manner 
in regulating the illicit sex acts of a U.S. citizen abroad because this conduct can be 
regulated . . . by the foreign nation in which the crime occurs.144 
In other words, because the Foreign Commerce Clause cases that give 
broad latitude to the federal government arise almost exclusively in the 
dormant Foreign Commerce Clause context, they are inapplicable when 
considering whether the Foreign Commerce Clause gives Congress the 
positive authority to pass criminal statutes.145 
Finally, an individual’s overseas conduct—no matter how 
despicable—simply “does not give rise to the same foreign relations 
concerns that the Supreme Court articulated in Japan Line,” and “Congress 
 
140 Id. at 959–69. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. at 957. 
143 Buffington, supra note 66, at 857. 
144 Id. at 858. 
145 United States v. Frank, 486 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1355–56 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (“[I]ts [sic] is 
not perceived that there is any limit to the questions which can be adjusted touching any 
matter which is properly the subject of negotiation with a foreign country.”) (citing Geofroy 
v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890)). 
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should not have broader power to enact a Foreign Commerce Clause statute 
regulating a U.S. citizen’s criminal conduct abroad than it has in regulating 
the citizen’s interstate conduct.”146  A related argument proffered for 
constraining congressional authority under the Foreign Commerce Clause is 
that “[i]ntrusions into the realm of other sovereigns must be legitimate 
exercises of power and must be taken with the utmost consideration toward 
the situs nation.”  With respect to § 2423(c), at least one commentator has 
argued, “Congress encroached upon the realm of another sovereign.”147 
III. DISCUSSION 
Having reviewed the background of the noncommercial prong of 
§ 2423(c) and the current, varied approaches to analyzing statutes under the 
Foreign Commerce Clause, the next step is to determine whether the 
Foreign Commerce Clause—or any other constitutional grant of authority to 
Congress—allows courts to enforce, consistent with the U.S. Constitution, 
the noncommercial prong of § 2423(c).148  Part A argues that when courts 
are considering the constitutionality of statutes passed pursuant to 
Congress’s Foreign Commerce Clause power, they should ask not only 
whether the statute regulates “commerce,” as defined by the Court’s 
Interstate Commerce Clause jurisprudence, but also whether such 
commerce is “with” a foreign nation.  Part A concludes that the Foreign 
Commerce Clause does not give Congress the authority to pass the 
noncommercial prong of § 2423(c). 
Part B argues that Congress’s power to pass legislation to enforce U.S. 
treaty obligations may give Congress the authority to pass the 
noncommercial prong of § 2423(c).  Part C then argues that, in the event 
that neither the Foreign Commerce Clause nor Congress’s power to pass 
laws implementing treaties provides a constitutional justification for the 
noncommercial prong of § 2423(c), prosecutors have new tools and trial 
strategies that make convictions under § 2423(b) more likely, such that 
§ 2423(b) has become an effective—and constitutionally sound—
alternative to § 2423(c). 
 
146 Buffington, supra note 66, at 858. 
147 Doerfel, supra note 135, at 349. 
148 “Every law enacted by Congress must be based on one or more of its powers 
enumerated in the Constitution.”  United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000); 
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803) (“The powers of the legislature are 
defined, and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution 
is written.”). 
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A. CRAFTING A FOREIGN COMMERCE CLAUSE TEST FOR § 2423(C) 
The Supreme Court should consent to review United States v. 
Pendleton, or a similar case, in order to provide definitive guidance to lower 
courts considering the extent of Congress’s power under the Foreign 
Commerce Clause.  As explained below, this Comment finds the analytical 
framework described supra in Part II.C.3 most persuasive, but even under a 
straightforward application of the Lopez test, as modified by subsequent 
cases, the noncommercial prong of § 2423(c) fails a Commerce Clause 
challenge.  This Part first explains why the combination of § 2323(c) and 
(f)(1) does not regulate commerce under currently reigning Supreme Court 
jurisprudence.  It then briefly explores why the fact that Congress is 
operating in the foreign, rather than the interstate, context supports a 
narrower interpretation of Congress’s commerce power. 
Like all courts that have addressed the constitutionality of § 2423(c), 
this Comment starts by examining whether the statute regulates commerce 
as defined by Lopez and subsequent cases.149  Congress can pass statutes 
pursuant to its Commerce Clause authority if there is a rational basis for 
concluding that the legislation regulates one of the three categories of 
commerce laid out in Lopez—(1) the channels of commerce, (2) the 
instrumentalities of commerce, or (3) intrastate activity that has a 
substantial effect on commerce.150  The noncommercial prong of § 2423(c) 
does not regulate an instrumentality of commerce.  An instrumentality of 
commerce is something that facilitates interstate commerce, such as a 
train,151 a ship,152 or a cargo container.153  Section 2423(c) regulates 
individuals’ conduct, not the planes or boats that transport those 
individuals. 
Section 2423(c) also does not regulate a channel of commerce.  The 
channels of commerce are “the interstate transportation routes through 
which persons and goods move,” including highways, railroads, navigable 
 
149 There is a great deal of common sense behind interpreting like words in a like fashion 
and different words in a different fashion.  Prakash, supra note 105, at 1149.  Therefore, this 
Comment takes the approach that “commerce” should be given the same definition across 
the three parts of the Commerce Clause—the Foreign Commerce Clause, the Interstate 
Commerce Clause, and the Indian Commerce Clause.  This has the added benefit of giving 
lower courts ample Supreme Court guidance as they undertake their constitutional 
analyses—there is no need to reinvent the Commerce Clause wheel in response to the 
growing importance of the Foreign Commerce Clause. 
150 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 
613 (2000). 
151 Pensacola Tel. Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 96 U.S. 1, 9 (1877). 
152 Transp. Co. v. Wheeling, 99 U.S. 273, 283 (1878). 
153 Japan Line, Ltd. v. Cnty. of L.A., 441 U.S. 434, 445–46 (1979). 
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waters, and airspace.154  It has been argued that because § 2423(c) requires 
a defendant to travel in foreign commerce, it clearly regulates a channel of 
commerce.155  But § 2423(c) does not truly purport to regulate passage on 
international flights; it purports to regulate citizens’ sexual conduct 
abroad.156  Section 2423(c) is distinguishable from statutes that regulate the 
use of the channels of commerce for injurious purposes because under those 
statutes, the channels of commerce either are used in the commission of the 
offense157 or are used with a criminal purpose in mind.158  Neither of those 
conditions is present in § 2423(c). 
Indeed, if courts upheld § 2423(c) under a “channels of commerce” 
framework solely because at some point—perhaps years or decades before 
committing a criminal act—an offender traveled in foreign commerce, 
Congress could criminalize essentially any action by anyone who travels to 
a foreign country.  Congress could criminalize overseas traffic violations, 
jaywalking, drug use, or virtually any other conduct by U.S. citizens if the 
only jurisdictional hook required was that the defendant first traveled from 
the United States to a foreign country.159  The Commerce Clause does not 
grant such extensive power.160  Further, such broad legislative power raises 
 
154 United States v. Ballinger, 395 F.3d 1218, 1225–26 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting 
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613); see also Pierce Cnty. v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129, 147 (2003) 
(upholding legislation “aimed at improving safety in the channels of commerce,” including 
streets, roads, and federal highways); Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 
U.S. 508, 518 (1941) (recognizing that navigable waters, railroads, and highways are 
“channels of commerce,” which can be regulated under Congress’s commerce powers). 
155 See, e.g., United States v. Pendleton, 658 F.3d 299, 310 (3d Cir. 2011). 
156 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c) (2006). 
157 See, e.g., id. § 2421 (criminalizing knowingly transporting an individual in interstate 
or foreign commerce with the intent that the transported individual engage in prostitution). 
158 See, e.g., id. §§ 1341 (criminalizing the use of the mail “for the purpose of executing” 
a criminal scheme or artifice), 2423(b) (criminalizing traveling in interstate or foreign 
commerce “for the purpose of engaging in any illicit sexual conduct”).  The Committee on 
Federal Criminal Jury Instructions of the Seventh Circuit appears to have read § 2423(c) to 
contain a requirement that the defendant travel with a criminal purpose in mind; it 
characterized the offense as “the defendant . . . traveling in foreign commerce to engage in 
illicit sexual conduct with a minor.”  7th Cir. PJI, supra note 36, at 635 (emphasis added).  
But this essentially adds back into the statute the intent element that the PROTECT Act 
deliberately removed, see supra Part II.A, and this one reading of the statute cannot save it. 
159 See United States v. Bianchi, 386 F. App’x 156, 164 (3d Cir. 2010) (Roth, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Because Congress severed any jurisdictional tie 
to the prohibited activity, it is untenable to use the travel element of section 2423(c) to 
shoehorn a subsequent, unconnected crime into the category of activities that substantially 
affect foreign commerce.”); cf. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615 (2000) (“[I]f Congress may 
regulate gender-motivated violence, it would be able to regulate murder or any other type of 
violence . . . .”). 
160 Cf. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 580 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(“[U]nlike the earlier cases to come before the Court here neither the actors nor their conduct 
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policy concerns related not only to the appropriate reach of U.S. authority 
but also to the related concern of maintaining respect for foreign states’ 
sovereignty within their borders. 
The noncommercial prong of § 2423(c) cannot satisfy the 
“substantially affects” prong of Lopez either.  Under the substantially 
affects prong, Congress has the “power to regulate purely local activities 
that are part of an economic ‘class of activities’ that have a substantial 
effect on interstate commerce.”161  As discussed in Part II.C.1, at least one 
court162 used this theory to uphold § 2423(c) on the ground that the effect of 
child sex abuse on the market for child prostitution (i.e., the idea that if a 
“consumer” of child sex abuse obtains his desired good for free, the entire 
commercial market is affected) is analogous to the effect of private wheat 
production on the highly regulated wheat market163 or of private marijuana 
production on the illegal marijuana market.164 
The substantially affects prong, as developed in Raich, has certainly 
expanded Congress’s power to regulate commerce, but it did not render that 
power unlimited.165  Child sex abuse is not an economic commodity 
equivalent to wheat or marijuana.  The Wickard Court acknowledged that 
the problem with a farmer’s production of wheat for individual 
consumption is that he “forestall[s] resort to the market,” thus removing a 
potential purchaser from the supply–demand equation.166  Likewise, the 
Raich Court approved Congress’s regulation of home-grown marijuana 
because marijuana is “a fungible commodity for which there is an 
established, albeit illegal, interstate market,” and “leaving home-consumed 
marijuana outside federal control would . . . affect price and market 
conditions.”167 
But child sex abuse is not a commodity that is typically purchased on 
 
has a commercial character, and neither the purposes nor the design of the statute has an 
evident commercial nexus. . . .  In a sense any conduct in this interdependent world of ours 
has an ultimate commercial origin or consequence, but we have not yet said the commerce 
power may reach so far.”). 
161 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005); see also Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 
128–29 (1942). 
162 Cf. United States v. Martinez, 599 F. Supp. 2d 784, 808 (W.D. Tex. 2009). 
163 Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128–29. 
164 Raich, 545 U.S. at 18–19. 
165 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608 (2000); cf. National Federation of 
Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2585–91 (2012) (articulating limits on 
Congress’s Commerce Clause power). 
166 Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127; see id. at 128 (“[Home-grown wheat] supplies a need of the 
man who grew it which would otherwise be reflected by purchases in the open market.  
Home-grown wheat in this sense competes with wheat in commerce.”). 
167 Raich, 545 U.S. at 18. 
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the open market; there is no similar tradeoff in which if individual 
production is regulated, the consumer is forced to participate in a 
commercial market that can be controlled by the federal government.  Most 
child sex abuse is perpetrated by children’s family members and close 
acquaintances,168 not anonymous purchasers.  Criminalizing the abuse of 
children does not encourage abusers to start engaging in market activity, 
such as paying providers of child prostitutes, that can be regulated as a 
commercial enterprise.  It just prohibits private, noneconomic activity that 
occurs wholly outside the markets.169  Thus, the noncommercial prong of 
§ 2423(c) is similar to the provision of the Violence Against Women Act 
(VAWA) that was struck down in United States v. Morrison.170  The 
statutory provision at issue in Morrison penalized engaging in gender-
motivated violence.171  In striking down that law as an impermissible 
extension of Congress’s Commerce Clause authority, the Morrison Court 
held that Congress cannot “regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct 
based solely on that conduct’s aggregate effect on interstate commerce.”172  
The activity prohibited by the noncommercial prong of § 2423(c) is of the 
same noneconomic, criminal character as the activity regulated by VAWA, 
and since VAWA could not satisfy the substantially affects prong of Lopez, 
§ 2423(c) cannot either. 
Although the foregoing analysis explains why the noncommercial 
prong of § 2423(c) is unconstitutional under the Interstate Commerce 
Clause test, there are good reasons why courts should adopt a slightly 
modified (and stricter) test for statutes that purport to regulate activity 
pursuant to Congress’s Foreign Commerce Clause authority.  In particular, 
there is a persuasive textual argument that the Framers’ choice to regulate 
commerce “with” foreign nations but “among” the states gives different 
meanings to the respective clauses.173  
The plain definitions of “with” and “among” seem to support 
commentators’ arguments that the different word choices signal different 
 
168 See Thomas Lyon, Child Witnesses and the Confrontation Clause, 102 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1181, 1203–04 & n.4 (2012) (collecting sources). 
169 Cf. Cortney Lollar, Child Pornography and the Restitution Revolution, 103 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 343, 392 (2013) (“Intrafamily sexual abuse occurs without regard to the 
market.”). 
170 529 U.S. at 617 (holding that Congress’s commerce power did not grant it the power 
to pass 18 U.S.C. § 13981). 
171 Id. at 601–02, 605–06. 
172 Id.; see also id. at 613. 
173 It is worth noting that the statutory definition of “foreign commerce” in the Criminal 
Code also highlights the importance of the word “with.”  The term “foreign commerce,” per 
statute, means “commerce with a foreign country.”  18 U.S.C. § 10 (2006) (emphasis added). 
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constitutional standards.174  “With” is “a function word” used “to indicate a 
participant in an action, transaction, or arrangement.”175  “Among” means 
“by or through the aggregate of” or “through the joint action of.”176  
“Among” by definition implicates the aggregate activity of sister-states, but 
“with” has no such denotation.  These definitions suggest that Congress’s 
power to regulate in the foreign context is narrower than in the interstate 
context because Congress cannot base its authority on an argument that a 
foreign nation’s intracountry activity, in the aggregate, substantially affects 
foreign commerce.  If the aggregate of noneconomic intracountry activity in 
a foreign nation falls outside of Congress’s Commerce Clause authority, a 
statute passed pursuant to the Foreign Commerce Clause is only valid if it 
regulates the instrumentalities or channels of foreign commerce.  This 
limitation seriously curtails Congress’s authority under the Foreign 
Commerce Clause and makes it even clearer that § 2423(c) exceeds 
congressional authority. 
The original intent and dormant Foreign Commerce Clause arguments 
discussed supra Part II.C provide additional support for the conclusion 
reached by the textual analysis—that the “best” Foreign Commerce Clause 
test is an adaptation of the Interstate Commerce Clause test as constrained 
by the language of the Foreign Commerce Clause.  The Foreign Commerce 
Clause was initially proposed and included in the Constitution to allow 
Congress to regulate trade with foreign nations and to prevent the states 
from developing inconsistent foreign trade policies that harmed the status of 
the developing United States in foreign affairs.177  But there is no indication 
in the early history or subsequent interpretations of the Foreign Commerce 
Clause that the Framers or early jurists intended Congress to have greater 
power to regulate under the Foreign Commerce Clause than the Interstate 
Commerce Clause.178 
Further, there is no principled rationale for relying on Japan Line and 
other dormant Foreign Commerce Clause cases to support an argument that 
Congress has plenary power to regulate pursuant to the Foreign Commerce 
Clause.179  Those cases reflect the unique federalist quality of governance in 
the United States; Congress’s power to regulate foreign commerce is broad 
when compared to the power of the states to regulate foreign commerce.180  
But that argument cannot be used to argue that Congress’s Foreign 
 
174 See supra note 139. 
175 MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1438 (11th ed. 2011). 
176 Id. at 41. 
177 See supra text accompanying notes 140–147. 
178 See supra text accompanying notes 140–147. 
179 See supra Part II.C.2.iii. 
180 Id. 
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Commerce Clause power is virtually unlimited, as courts have mistakenly 
done.181  Where Congress acts to negate state action (in the case of the 
dormant Foreign Commerce Clause), the typical federalist concerns arise 
and, as in the interstate context, Congress’s power trumps state power.  But 
when Congress acts in a positive manner, by passing laws that regulate 
overseas conduct, it runs into a different constraint on power—the 
sovereignty of foreign nations.182  Concern that congressional action may 
infringe on other nations’ autonomy makes it good policy to ensure that 
Congress’s power is carefully limited according to the Constitution. 
Careful analysis of Commerce Clause case law and policy makes clear 
that the noncommercial prong of § 2423(c) exceeds the authority granted to 
Congress by the U.S. Constitution. 
B. REFRAMING THE ISSUE—USING CONGRESS’S TREATY POWER 
Despite the failure of the Foreign Commerce Clause to support the 
noncommercial prong of § 2423(c), the statute should survive facial 
challenges to its constitutionality.  Outside of the First Amendment context, 
a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a statute will succeed only by 
“establish[ing] that no set of circumstances exists under which the [statute] 
would be valid.”183  An examination of Congress’s power to legislate to 
enforce the United States’ treaty obligations shows that § 2423(c) is likely 
constitutional. 
The Constitution endows Congress, through Article II, Section 2, 
Clause 2 and the Necessary and Proper Clause, with the authority to pass 
laws to implement treaties.184  The executive branch has the power to make 
treaties.185  But once a valid treaty has been enacted, it falls on Congress to 
pass legislation, if necessary, to enforce the treaty’s provisions.186  If a 
treaty is valid, “there can be no dispute about the validity of [statutes] under 
Article I, Section 8, [enacted] as a necessary and proper means to execute 
 
181 Id. 
182 See sources cited supra note 135. 
183 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).  The First Amendment is unique 
because it also recognizes an “overbreadth” doctrine.  Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 269 
n.18 (1984). 
184 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18, art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see also United States v. Belfast, 611 
F.3d 783, 804 (11th Cir. 2010) (“Collectively, these clauses empower Congress to enact any 
law that is necessary and proper to effectuate a treaty made pursuant to Article II.”); United 
States v. Flath, 11-CR-69, 2011 WL 6299941, at *9 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 14, 2011) 
(recommending to the district court that “it was proper for Congress to enact § 2423(c) under 
the Necessary and Proper Clause of the Constitution to implement the Optional Protocol”). 
185 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
186 See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920); United States v. Lue, 134 F.3d 
79, 82 (2d Cir. 1998). 
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the powers of the Government.”187 
For example, in 2001, Congress passed 18 U.S.C. § 2340A and related 
statutes to implement the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT).188  The Eleventh 
Circuit tested the constitutionality of this enactment in United States v. 
Belfast.189  The Belfast court held that “[t]he United States validly adopted 
the CAT pursuant to the President’s Article II treaty-making authority, and 
it was well within Congress’s power under the Necessary and Proper Clause 
to criminalize [] torture, as defined by the Torture Act.”190  The defendant 
argued that § 2340A exceeded Congress’s power to pass laws to implement 
treaties domestically, because the language of the statute was broader than 
the language of the treaty.191  But the Belfast court observed that statutory 
language does not have to mirror treaty language verbatim; it only has to 
track treaty language in all “material respects.”192 
In 2002 (just a year before enacting the PROTECT Act) the United 
States ratified the Optional Protocol.193  The Optional Protocol expressed 
“grave[] concern[] at the significant and increasing international traffic of 
children for the purpose of the sale of children, child prostitution, and child 
pornography.”194  The treaty requires party states to prohibit the sale of 
children, child prostitution, and child pornography.195  The treaty explicitly 
calls upon each member party to ensure that those offenses are “fully 
covered under its criminal or penal law, whether these offences are 
committed domestically or transnationally.”196  The Optional Protocol 
builds on the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which requires 
member states—including the United States—to “take all appropriate 
legislative, administrative, social and educational measures to protect the 
child from all forms of physical or mental violence, . . . including sexual 
 
187 Holland, 252 U.S. at 432. 
188 Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-
236, § 506, 108 Stat. 382 (2004); Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. 
NO. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force June 26, 1987).  For another example, see 
Lue, 134 F.3d at 84 (upholding the constitutionality of the Hostage Taking Act as a valid 
exercise of Congress’s power under the Necessary and Proper Clause to pass domestic laws 
enforcing the Hostage Taking Convention). 
189 611 F.3d 783 (11th Cir. 2010). 
190 Id. at 793. 
191 Id. at 803. 
192 Id. at 806 (citing Lue, 134 F.3d at 84). 
193 Optional Protocol, supra note 7. 
194 Id. at pmbl. 
195 Id. at art. 1. 
196 Id. at art. 3, ¶ 1. 
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abuse.”197  The Optional Protocol explicitly calls for member states, 
including the United States, to implement domestic legislation protecting 
children from sexual abuse by their citizens, regardless of whether the abuse 
occurs domestically or overseas.  Because § 2423(c) responds to that 
command, it is a constitutional exercise of Congress’s power to pass 
legislation to enforce treaty obligations. 
Some courts have observed, in dicta, that the Optional Protocol 
authorized Congress to pass § 2423(c).198  One U.S. magistrate speculated 
that “§ 2423 was passed to enforce a multilateral treaty designed to protect 
children from transnational and domestic child sex prostitution.”199  She 
concluded that “it was proper for Congress to enact § 2423(c) under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause of the Constitution to implement the Optional 
Protocol.”200  Because § 2423(c) rationally relates to specific Articles of the 
Optional Protocol dealing with child prostitution, the statute “reasonably 
implements the Optional Protocol.”201  Even the Pendleton district court 
contemplated that § 2423(c) and (f)(1) are “‘necessary and proper’ to the 
implementation of the United States’ international treaty obligations” under 
the Optional Protocol.202  Courts should more confidently rely on 
Congress’s Necessary and Proper Clause power to implement the Optional 
Protocol when considering the constitutionality of § 2423(c), rather than 
relying on the Commerce Clause analysis challenged in Part III.A. 
C. AVOIDING THE ISSUE—RENEWED ABILITY TO PROSECUTE  
UNDER § 2423(B) 
Even if a court eventually decides that § 2423(c) is not a valid exercise 
of congressional authority—or if prosecutors want to avoid relying on 
 
197 Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 7, at art. 19. 
198 United States v. Martinez, 599 F. Supp. 2d 784, 798–99 (W.D. Tex. 2009); United 
States v. Pendleton, No. 08-111-GMS, 2009 WL 330965, at *4 (D. Del. Feb. 11, 2009); 
United States v. Bianchi, No. 06-19, 2007 WL 1521123, at *5 (E.D. Pa. May 22, 2007); 
United States v Frank, 486 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1358–59 (S.D. Fla. 2007); see also United 
States v. Flath, 11-CR-69, 2011 WL 6299941, at *9 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 14, 2011).  Although 
the Flath district court decided the case on the narrower Foreign Commerce Clause ground, 
see United States v. Flath, 845 F. Supp. 2d 951, 957 (2012), and did not adopt the portion of 
the magistrate’s recommendation relating to the Optional Protocol, it did note that “it finds 
no discernible fault with the [m]agistrate’s recommendation in th[at] regard.”  Id. 
199 Martinez, 599 F. Supp. 2d at 799 (referring to the Optional Protocol). 
200 Flath, 2011 WL 6299941, at *9. 
201 Id. 
202 Pendleton, 2009 WL 330965, at *4 (citing S. TREATY DOC. NO. 106-37, 39 L.L.M. 
1285); see also Frank, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 1356–58; United States v. Pepe, No. 07-168 DSF, 
slip op. at 6 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2007). 
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§ 2423(c) until its constitutional status is more settled203—prosecutors can 
obtain substantially the same results by using § 2423(b) to prosecute child 
molesters whose conduct occurs overseas.204  Section 2423(b) stands on 
solid constitutional ground.205  The criminal act in § 2423(b) is not 
necessarily the exploitation of a child, but rather “the foreign travel with an 
illicit intent.”206  Because § 2423(b) criminalizes traveling with the intent to 
commit a sexual offense with a minor, offenders accomplish their criminal 
purpose when they use the channels of commerce.207 
The current version of § 2423(c) “targets the same individuals as does 
§ 2423(b),” but attempts to make it easier for prosecutors to punish those 
individuals.208  Although it is admirable to increase prosecutions of 
individuals who take advantage of lax foreign laws on sex offenses, it is not 
permissible to do so by violating constitutional precepts.  Rather, 
prosecutors should take advantage of trial strategies that are becoming 
increasingly popular—and successful—in child sex exploitation cases 
where intent must be proven but is difficult to prove by direct evidence.209 
First, a major advance in resources available to prosecutors seeking to 
prove intent under § 2423(b) is the increasing willingness of courts to admit 
expert testimony on the behavior and characteristics of child molesters.210  
 
203 Prosecutors can, of course, use both 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) and (c) where appropriate. 
204 An added advantage of relying on § 2423(b) is that it avoids the overcriminalization 
debate that § 2423(c) might provoke.  The propriety of criminal statutes lacking a mens rea 
requirement, such as § 2423(c), has been hotly contested.  See Reining in 
Overcriminalization: Assessing the Problem, Proposing Solutions: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th 
Cong. 2 (2010) (statement of Rep. Robert C. “Bobby” Scott, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on 
Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland Sec.) (referring to the “disturbing disappearance of the 
common law requirement of mens rea”).  Further, critics of overcriminalization are 
concerned at the rapid growth of the federal criminal code and argue against the 
implementation of duplicative statutes.  See id. at 1–2.  Because § 2423(c) strikes at largely 
the same conduct as § 2423(b), but removes the intent requirement, it is fertile ground for 
overcriminalization objections.  Section 2423(b) has no such problems. 
205 See, e.g., United States v. Bianchi, 386 F. App’x 156, 162 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing 
United States v. Tykarsky, 446 F.3d 458, 470 (3d Cir. 2006)); United States v. Bredimus, 
352 F.3d 200, 208 (5th Cir. 2003); United States v. Shutts, No. 07-20816-CR, 2008 WL 
162662, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 16, 2008); United States v. Kaechele, 466 F. Supp. 2d 868, 
892–99 (E.D. Mich. 2006). 
206 United States v. Martinez, 599 F. Supp. 2d 784, 796 (W.D. Tex. 2009) (citing 
Bredimus, 352 F.3d at 210). 
207 See, e.g., Shutts, 2008 WL 162662, at *4. 
208 United States v. Pendleton, 658 F.3d 299, 304 (3d Cir. 2011). 
209 See Bianchi, 386 F. App’x at 162 (wondering why “the government would need or 
even want to charge § 2423(c) violations when the evidence of § 2423(b) violations . . . 
is . . . clear”). 
210 See, e.g., United States v. Hayward, 359 F.3d 631, 637 (3d Cir. 2004) (finding that 
testimony by a behavioral scientist was admissible as expert testimony where it “‘focused 
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As an example, in United States v. Hayward, a behavioral scientist and FBI 
agent, Kenneth Lanning, was permitted to testify regarding “patterns 
exhibited by many acquaintance child molesters.”211  Those patterns include 
“selection of victims from dysfunctional homes, formulation of a 
customized seduction process, lowering the victim’s inhibitions about sex, 
isolating the victim, and soliciting the victim’s cooperation in the 
victimization process.”212 
The defendant in Hayward argued that Agent Lanning’s testimony 
violated Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b), which prohibits an expert in a 
criminal case from stating an opinion “about whether the defendant did or 
did not have a mental state or condition that constitutes an element of the 
crime charged or of a defense.”213  The Hayward court rejected this 
argument, recognizing that the circuit courts have long approved admission 
of expert testimony that “merely supports an inference or conclusion that 
the defendant did or did not have the requisite mens rea, so long as the 
expert does not draw the ultimate inference or conclusion for the jury.”214 
Courts have interpreted Rule 704(b) to permit expert testimony 
regarding characteristics of sex offenders generally but not regarding 
experts’ opinions as to whether a particular defendant is a sex offender or is 
guilty of the crime charged.215  Thus, in Hayward, because Agent Lanning 
never testified directly about the defendant’s personal mens rea, only about 
the typical motives and practices of a child molester, his testimony did not 
violate Rule 704(b) and was properly admitted over objection.216  Similarly, 
in United States v. Romero, the court permitted Agent Lanning to testify 
regarding characteristics of sex offenders: 
[T]he main thrust of Agent Lanning’s testimony described the modus operandi of 
modern child molesters: devoting large amounts of time to finding and establishing 
relationships with children; choosing emotionally or mentally disturbed children 
because of their susceptibility to manipulation; probing the child’s needs and interests 
and then mirroring those needs or attempting to fulfill them; and engaging in 
compulsive behavior even when that behavior increases the risk of getting caught.217 
The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that expert testimony serves to 
 
primarily on the modus operandi—on the actions normally taken by child molesters to find 
and seduce their victims’”) (quoting United States v. Romero, 189 F.3d 576, 586 (7th Cir. 
1999)).  But see United States v. Raymond, 700 F. Supp. 2d 142 (D. Me. 2010). 
211 Hayward, 359 F.3d at 636. 
212 Id. 
213 FED. R. EVID. 704(b); Hayward, 359 F.3d at 636. 
214 Hayward, 359 F.3d at 636 (citing United States v. Bennett, 161 F.3d 171, 185 (3d Cir. 
1998); United States v. Morales, 108 F.3d 1031, 1038 (9th Cir. 1997)). 
215 See, e.g., Hayward, at 636; Romero, 189 F.3d at 582. 
216 Hayward, 359 F.3d at 636–37. 
217 Romero, 189 F.3d at 585. 
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illuminate the criminal nature behind what seems like innocent conduct, 
which can help a jury decide whether a defendant had the intent to molest a 
specific child.218 
In Pendleton, the testimony of an expert like Agent Lanning could 
have been used to provide the jury with enough background knowledge to 
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant traveled in foreign 
commerce with the intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct with Dieter.219  
Pendleton certainly spent a lot of time cultivating a relationship with Dieter.  
He spent over six months corresponding with Dieter by mail and visiting 
Dieter at his group home before molesting him on the bike trip.  Pendleton 
targeted an emotionally vulnerable boy—he had a deceased father and a 
sick mother and lived in an orphanage with virtually no other contact with 
the outside world.  He spent time building up a shared interest—biking—
that he later used to take advantage of Dieter.  And, when he sent a letter to 
Dieter after molesting him, he likely engaged in “compulsive behavior even 
when that behavior increase[d] the risk of being caught.”220 
Further, in addition to admitting expert testimony, courts have allowed 
witnesses to testify at § 2423 trials regarding a defendant’s past abuse of 
children.221  Courts have admitted such testimony as modus operandi 
evidence over defense counsel objections that it is impermissible propensity 
evidence, admission of which violates Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b).222  
Courts have admitted such evidence under Rules 413 and 414, which allow 
evidence of a defendant’s previous crimes of sexual assault and child 
molestation that “demonstrat[es] a propensity to commit such crimes.”223 
As with the expert testimony, this tool could have been used to convict 
Pendleton under § 2423(b).  At Pendleton’s trial, the prosecution produced 
a witness, Mark Rowe, who testified that when he was approximately 
twelve years old, Pendleton molested him.224  Pendleton’s molestation of 
Mark and his molestation of Dieter bore striking similarities.  As with 
 
218 Id. at 586 (analogizing to expert testimony admitted in drug trafficking cases to 
comment on the criminal purpose behind social behavior of drug traffickers). 
219 The significance is that the government could have obtained a conviction under the 
constitutionally sound 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) instead of the potentially constitutionally 
deficient § 2423(c). 
220 Romero, 189 F.3d at 585. 
221 FED. R. EVID. 414; see, e.g., United States v. McGuire, 627 F.3d 622, 626–27 (7th 
Cir. 2010); United States v. Rogers, 587 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. 
Zahursky, 580 F.3d 515, 525 (7th Cir. 2009). 
222 McGuire, 627 F.3d at 626–27. 
223 Id. at 627. 
224 Transcript of Record, supra note 42, at 191–96.  Again, the victim is now over 
eighteen years of age, but his name has been changed throughout this Comment.  See supra 
note 45. 
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Dieter, Pendleton knew Mark for several months before committing any 
acts of molestation and, in Mark, he targeted another child with 
psychological problems.225 
The actual conduct also looked quite similar—Pendleton and Mark 
were introduced through an adult friend of Pendleton (Mark’s mother), and 
Mark was convinced to go on a biking trip with Pendleton.226  On the trip, 
Mark had a tent to himself, but one night, Pendleton came into the tent and 
asked Mark if he could give Mark a massage.227  Pendleton started 
massaging the boy’s stomach and then sexually assaulted him.228  The story 
of Pendleton’s pursuit and molestation of Mark runs nearly parallel to that 
of his pursuit and molestation of Dieter; it would have been easily admitted 
as modus operandi evidence that could have helped a jury infer intent and 
likely return a guilty verdict under § 2423(b). 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The noncommercial prong of § 2423(c) is not a valid exercise of 
Congress’s power to regulate “Commerce with foreign Nations.”229  It may, 
however, be a valid exercise of Congress’s power to enact legislation to 
enforce treaties to which the United States is a party.  Thus, prosecutions of 
individuals under § 2423(c)—like the prosecution of Thomas Pendleton—
are permissible under the U.S. Constitution.  Further, prosecutors now have 
more tools than ever for prosecuting individuals who sexually molest 
children abroad under § 2423(b), which permits prosecutors to avoid using 
§ 2423(c) until it stands on sturdier constitutional footing (or, perhaps, to 
charge both § 2423(b) and (c), where appropriate). 
Ultimately, the analysis contained in Parts II–III of this section does 
not apply only to § 2423(c).  Rather, the analytical framework and 
conclusion offered apply to any statute criminalizing conduct occurring 
entirely overseas.  As Congress seeks to expand its reach extraterritorially, 
it is increasingly important that courts adequately consider these issues in 
evaluating defendants’ inevitable constitutional challenges.  Further, it 
would be advisable for Congress to draft future legislation with these types 
of issues in mind.  Adding jurisdictional “hooks,” such as intent 
requirements on statutes purporting to regulate travel, or even (albeit 
nonbinding) statements of constitutional authority to guide courts’ analyses, 
 
225 Transcript of Record, supra note 42, at 178. 
226 Id. at 192–94, 198–99. 
227 Id. at 200. 
228 Id. at 200–01. 
229 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
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may clear up some of the confusion that has led to such drastically 
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